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-Introduction
Speculative attacks are based on information which is in parts publicly available or provided by media and agencies that are recognised by all major traders on foreign exchange markets.
Public information is not just helpful in predicting the future course of an economy, but also induces higher order beliefs that allow for crises occurring out of self-fulfilling beliefs. In this paper, we analyze the question whether multiple sources of public information prevent selffulfilling prophecies.
Second generation speculative attack models in the tradition of Obstfeld (1986 Obstfeld ( , 1996 can be modelled as coordination games with multiple equilibria. Whether a central bank devaluates a currency depends on market pressures that arise from traders' beliefs about the probability of devaluation. If traders believe in devaluation and speculate against a currency, market pressure may force a central bank to abandon a peg that it would have kept without the additional pressure generated by speculators. Applying the global-game approach, Morris and Shin (1998) have shown that this kind of coordination games has a unique equilibrium, if traders' information is private instead of public.
1 Morris and Shin (2003) and Hellwig (2002) show that equilibrium uniqueness requires that agents attach a sufficiently large weight to private information when both, private and public signals are available. Bayesian rationality requires that weights are positively related to the precision of information, which is the inverse of the variance of the respective signals. Thus, uniqueness relies on private signals being sufficiently precise in comparison to public signals. The most precise information, however, is provided publicly by transparent central banks and well informed agencies. This raises concerns of whether economic transparency may lead the inclination to self-fulfilling prophecies. One counterargument is that agents deal the same information differently and posterior beliefs are private information even if all information about economic fundamentals is publicly available.
While many figures about an economy are provided publicly and become common knowledge (at least in theory), the precision of these figures is usually not public information.
A rare exception is the reports by the Bank of England that publishes "fan charts" in addition 1 A signal is private information if it is received by a single agent and public information if it is received by all agents, all agents know that all agents received the same signal, and so on.
to inflation forecasts. 2 With multiple public signals, beliefs about the relative precision of these signals may differ between agents and lead to different posterior beliefs about the state of the world.
In this paper, we introduce multiple sources of public information in the currency-attack model by Shin (1998, 2003 approaches infinity, the distribution of posterior beliefs becomes common knowledge. This turns the private-information game into a private-value game, for which we know that it has a unique equilibrium, provided that there is a sufficient mass of agents for whom either action is a dominant strategy (Dönges and Heinemann, 2001 ). In our model, this requires that the average precision of public signals is sufficiently low.
In terms of economic policy, we conclude that the central bank should benefit from at least two tools: if used appropriately, number and precision of public announcements can be effective at stabilising the economy in situations where it might be prone to self-fulfilling crises otherwise. The provision of different specialized data about the fundamentals of an economy reduces the inclination to self-fulfilling prophecies in comparison to the provision of 2 Fan charts indicate estimated probabilities for future inflation rates. These probabilities account for estimated forecast errors, but not for possible errors in the model underlying these estimates.
just one compound announcement. With a sufficiently large number of public signals, the probability that an economy is hit by a crisis due to self-fulfilling beliefs can be reduced to almost zero, provided that these signals are not too precise.
Section 2 introduces the formal model. In Section 3 we give conditions for equilibrium uniqueness. We solve the model for three special cases and develop the intuition that yields robust insights in the interaction between the distribution of signals and the distribution of private beliefs for the determinacy of equilibrium behaviour. In section 4 we draw conclusions for the optimal modes of information dissemination. Section 5 concludes the paper by summing up the main results.
-Model
The model builds on the reduced form of a currency-attack game introduced by Morris and Shin (1998 Shin ( , 2003 . It deals with an open economy in which the central bank has anchored its exchange rate on a fixed parity. Our main innovation is the introduction of multiple public signals.
Reduced form game
There is a continuum of agents As so often, the answer is that "it depends." In the following pages we analyze conditions under which multiple sources of public information lead to a unique equilibrium.
Multiple Public Signals
We extend the model by introducing 1 > K public signals received by speculators. Each signal k y differs from the fundamental state θ by a noise term with a normal distribution, i.e. and assume (without loss of
. We interpret each k as one source of public information.
Each agent takes into account the whole vector of K commonly observable signals. But, they do not know the true variances and attribute subjective weights to each of these signals.
The posterior associated with a vector of normally distributed signals Y is a weighted average of these signals,
, where the weights are given by the relative precision (inverse variance) of these signals,
We assume that agents know the aggregate level of uncertainty in the economy, so that
is common knowledge. But, they do not know the objective weights k q for each of the public signals that they should use to form their expectations. Instead, each agent has a private belief about these weights that we denote by ) , ,
Of course, these weights must sum up to one, so that they are contained in a K-dimensional simplex,
An agent who believes that relative precisions are given by i q has a posterior subjective belief about θ that is described by a normal distribution with
Equilibrium Strategies
A strategy is a function a i , such that: 
For a given vector of public signals Y, the proportion of attacking speculators is
The central bank devaluates the currency if this proportion exceeds θ . Thus, for any vector of public announcements Y and for any strategy profile a, the currency will be devaluated if and
Thereby, the decision problem of a single agent boils down to attack if and only if the subjective probability for the state being worse than some threshold * θ is sufficiently large.
The expected payoff from an attack for agent i, given the strategy combination a, the vector of public signals Y, and the agent's subjective beliefs
denotes the subjective probability that an agent with subjective beliefs i q attributes to the event of devaluation. Given the normality of subjective conditional distributions, we can express the expected payoff using the cumulative standard normal distribution Φ . Agent i attacks the currency if
(
Recall that conditional variances are the same for all agents. Equation (1) shows that an agent attacks if her posterior expectation is below some threshold, at which the expected reward from an attack equals its costs. The proportion of attackers is the proportion of all agents with a subjective expectation below this threshold. For an equilibrium strategy combination, this proportion must equal the critical proportion at the marginal state Equation (2) is equivalent to A general algebraic characterization is intractable. To get an intuition for uniqueness conditions, we characterise them for a particular distribution of private weights i q and for three special cases for the number of signals, K = 2, K = 3 and K → ∞ . Then, we explain the rationale that carries over to general settings.
-Equilibrium uniqueness
In this section, we derive some conditions for equilibrium uniqueness for different numbers of public signals. We show that public information, if interpreted or dealt differently by agents, can lead to a unique equilibrium, even in some cases where the objective posterior hints at a state at which an attack may occur out of self-fulfilling prophecies, if this posterior is common knowledge. While the two-dimensional case is useful to illustrate the consequences of private information about variances, some results are not robust with respect to the number of signals. We solve the case for three signals which is more complicated, but yields robust insights in the interaction between the particular signals and the distribution of private beliefs for the determinacy of equilibrium behaviour. Finally, we solve the case for an infinite number of public signals under more general conditions. This case shows how the accuracy of public announcements affects the existence of multiple equilibria.
For our formal analysis we assume that subjective weights . Now assume, instead, that one signal hints at a particular bad state at which an attack is a dominant strategy, e.g.
Then, there is a positive mass of agents, who believe that attacking is a dominant strategy.
Since the distribution is common knowledge, other agents know that there are some fellows, who believe strongly in the worst news and will attack. Thus, they expect a critical mass of attacking capital that raises their own threshold up to which an attack is a dominant strategy.
Agents with higher posteriors will attack, because they know that a certain fraction of agents attacks anyway. Since other agents know this as well, some traders with even higher posteriors attack. Higher order beliefs, expressed by the iterative elimination of dominated strategies, lead agents to attack up to some threshold that may represent a unique equilibrium.
But, uniqueness requires that at least one signal is outside the multiplicity region and that the distribution is sufficiently thick (in particular at the edges), so that enough mass is attracted in each step of the elimination procedure.
With one signal in the "attack" region, θ the lower signal hints at a state, at which attacking is a dominant strategy and the high signal hints at a state where not-attacking is a dominant strategy. Since this condition rules out equilibria in which all or no agent attack, the game has a unique equilibrium with an interior threshold that arises from an iterative elimination procedure as illustrated in Figure 1 . Indeed, with K=3, we get a similar shape for the cumulative distribution of posterior beliefs even with a uniform distribution of q on the unit simplex.
Equilibrium in the case of three public signals
To analyze uniqueness conditions with more than two signals, we treat both sides of equation 
For K = 3, the equilibrium condition is written as follows:
, the game has a unique equilibrium. , either action looses its appeal, if they know that the proportion of attacking agents is bounded away from zero or one, respectively. This leads to a smaller region for which neither action is dominant strategy. The size of these steps of elimination depends on the mass of agents for whom either action can be predicted from their extreme beliefs. If the number of agents with extreme beliefs is small, then the iteration procedures stop early and the interval for which posterior beliefs are self-fulfilling is reduced only slightly. However, if a sufficiently large mass of agents is in the respective dominance region, the iteration steps are large and converge to a single threshold.
Equilibrium in the case of an infinite number of public signals
We determine the analytical solution for equilibrium uniqueness in the case where the number of public signals tends to infinity and give some intuition for a large but finite number of signals.
To ease the exposition, we assume 
Intuition for K finite larger than 3
If public signals are rather precise, then most signals are close to the true state θ . Thereby, most agents' posteriors are close to the true state, even though they differ in their opinion about the relative precision of signals. If the true state happens to be in the interior of the region ) , ( θ θ , then there are multiple equilibria for a sufficiently high precision of public signals. This occurs with some positive probability. The lower the precision of public signals, the wider the dispersion of posterior beliefs and the smaller is the region of states, for which multiple equilibria exist. Thereby, the probability that the economy is endangered by selffulfilling beliefs gets smaller. If the precision of public signals is sufficiently small, then there is a unique equilibrium for all states θ . This shows that the precision of public signals is related to the prior probability of an economy being endangered by crises out of self-fulfilling beliefs. In this sense, our results lead to a similar conclusion as the global-game approach by Morris and Shin (2003): uniqueness requires that public information is not too precise. However, our results differ Finally, the number of signals is also ambiguous. Two intertwined effects go in opposite directions: with a large number of signals, there is a higher chance of getting signals in extreme areas while with a higher dimension, there might be some amplifying effects due to higher order beliefs.
We thus make the case that public information is not per se (automatically) destabilising.
Our model is less deterministic than second generation models that always give multiple equilibria in the intermediate zone and private information models that always find some conditions for uniqueness (as soon as private information is sufficiently precise). Providing multiple public signals does not exclude multiple equilibria, but reduces the likelihood that conditions for multiplicity are met. 
-Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the difficulties linked with the dichotomy between public information on the one hand and private information on the other. How increasing public information without increasing private information, and vice versa? Those two notions should be linked although theory clearly distinguishes them. In the literature, there typically lacks a model that could show how diverse sources of information or differences in the treatment of information could avoid common posterior beliefs, thus creating sufficient differences in the evaluation of publicly available information to prevent self-fulfilling beliefs equilibria. Here, we try to fill in the theoretical gap between public and private information, by proposing a private value game applied to the traditional speculative-attack model.
It is well known that common knowledge is difficult to establish in practice. However, financial markets are very transparent and many informational signals are disclosed by the central bank, or any other institution. On the exchange rate market, there is a plurality of channels (media) which disclose more or less precise (but "objectively mistaken") public information. Hence, any information is observed by all the agents; as agents are rational, they are aware of that. Common knowledge of posterior beliefs does not only require that all agents share the same information, it also requires that agents share the beliefs about the conditional distribution of the revealed information, given the fundamentals. As a consequence, even if all agents share the same information, agents may differ in their evaluation of these signals, and thus in their posterior beliefs. This does not require private information. Agents may agree to disagree. By creating disparities between agents' posterior beliefs, multiple sources of public information can avoid self-fulfilling beliefs equilibria. Such a model can help to explain why and how attacks are determined, even when the most relevant information about fundamentals is publicly disclosed. 
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